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Gender, War and Technology: Peace and Armed 
Conflict in the 21st Century 
 
Introduction 
 
Emily Jones,1 Sara Kendall2 and Yoriko Otomo3 
Since the end of the last world war, the global order has witnessed tremendous change. 
Social, behavioural and economic changes have been shaped in large part by a post war 
ideology that presumed scalable inventions could make human life extend further, act faster, 
and work cheaper.4  Technological developments have continued to shape the global order on 
multiple registers, including in the realm of armed conflict. With the evolution of proxy 
warfare during and after the Cold War (and the resulting war-weariness among the 
populations of the Great Powers), the capacity for states to exercise their influence, both 
remotely and diffusely, has been driving the global military research agenda. The second half 
of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of the internet, the development of 
cybernetics/artificial intelligence, and the creation of new genetic and programmable 
materials as well as laser weaponry. This century such technologies have evolved to produce 
the likes of drones, the emerging category of lethal autonomous weapons or ‘LAWs’, and 
other military land-based autonomous and semi-autonomous robots.5 All of these 
developments have occurred against the backdrop of a radically uneven global order, 
intensifying divisions between regions, states, peoples and groups, and entrenching existing 
inequalities, both transnationally and within states. 
The transformation of armed conflict through such inventions has not only shaped targeting 
methods and the remoteness of warfare, among many other factors, but has also produced an 
apocalyptic vision of everyday surveillance warfare.6 This has provoked sustained global 
debate, both in international law and international policy, ranging from technical questions 
regarding the applicability of existing legal frameworks to normative questions around the 
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value of new means and methods of warfare.7 In a telling example from late 2017, a UC 
Berkeley-based computer scientist and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots advocacy 
organisation used a United Nations platform to screen a dystopian futuristic film, 
‘Slaughterbots’, to call greater state attention to the perils of autonomous weapons systems 
while lobbying for an international treaty to ban their use.8 The event illustrates how 
overlapping communities – academics, humanitarian activists and state representatives – turn 
to legal forms as sites of potential redress and regulation of technological developments in 
armed conflict that are seen to threaten human well-being. It also invites critical reflection: 
about the relation between the human and the non-human (or indeed post-human); the 
broader political economies of armed conflict in which such weapons may be used; the role 
of legal architectures in constraining – and at times enabling – the use of force and methods 
of warfare; and on what other forms of suffering remain hidden from view when spectacular 
forms of violence determine political agendas. 
There is a pressing need for further examination of the interplay between these emerging 
inventions against existing international laws and the changing backdrop of contemporary 
armed conflict. The role of gender in their creation, production and deployment has been 
under-theorised to date:  this special issue is an invitation to others to think with us.9 
Contributors to this issue undertake their analyses alongside, but not within, existing legal 
debates, which predominantly concern matters of procedure and classification. The articles 
here look outwards, at some of the more amorphous but no less important forces that shape 
law and war: the interplay between rhetoric, images, ideology, and affect.  
What matters of concern appear within this constellation?10 As the following articles 
illustrate, triangulating gender, war and technology as a field of inquiry produces a wide 
domain of analysis, with topics ranging from human enhancement technologies to 
autonomous weapons systems, surveillance and aerial bombardment, artificial intelligence 
and big data. The three terms themselves invite interpretation and debate.11 The first term, 
‘gender’, has been used in the context of international humanitarian law to signify 
vulnerability; women are treated as a group that may require further protection, where gender 
operates as a qualified identity that supplements the category of civilian (or indeed, comes to 
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define the category of civilian).12 Yet some of the articles considered here adopt a more 
reflexive approach informed by feminist scholarship, considering issues of agency, 
difference, and intersectionality, and contesting gendered constructions that presuppose 
femininity, ethnicity, and passivity. The gendered subjects of law and war are at the same 
time subjects embedded within political economies of race, class, ability, age and other 
factors. While gender serves as the primary focus of many articles within this special issue, 
gender theory’s commitment to intersectionality can be seen throughout, with articles 
considering issues of race, colonialism, ability, masculinity and capitalism (and thus, 
implicitly, class). Beyond this special issue, the field would benefit from analysis of the 
broader range of intersectional concerns that emerge from recent technological developments 
in warfare. 
 
The second term, ‘war’, is understood though drawing on existing feminist and gender 
critiques of war and armed conflict. Our point of departure is Cockburn’s well known 
‘continuum of violence’, whereby war and peace are noted to be part of a shared continuum 
as opposed to distinct (legal) categories.13 Such an outlook disrupts legal categorisations of 
conflicts by acknowledging that when a conflict ends as a matter of law, it has not necessarily 
ended for people living through it.14 Not only do the place and time of ‘armed’ conflict then 
become questions, but presumptions about who produces, participates in, and is affected by 
conflict are also revisited and critiqued. 
The final term, ‘technology’, has been defined within the context of conflict in the 21st 
century, following the post war ideological movement described above.  We are aware of the 
vast amount of literature which seeks to define technology broadly, with Heidegger defining 
technology to include things such as art and law, roughly defining technology as a tool and 
theorising how it is technology which helps humans become human.15 This special issue 
focuses on technology specifically within the context of 21st century armed conflict, such as 
military technologies and/or algorithmic decision-making and data collection. In light of the 
multiple ways in which technology is changing conflict, we argue that the focus on these 
technologies reflects the ways in which technology is impacting on and changing the global 
order and conflict. This  special issue seeks to draw attention to the urgent need for gendered 
perspectives on the interrelationships between war and technology.   
 
Who or what is engaged in armed conflict? 
Drawing on existing feminist and gender critiques of war and armed conflict, seeking to 
question the presumptions about who produces, participates in, and is affected by conflict, 
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this special issues seeks to expand narrow legal concepts of actors, participation, and chains 
of causality. Furthermore, by using feminist and gender critiques of subjectivity, the special 
issue interrogates definitions of both the human and nonhuman while also emphasising the 
links between the two in a posthuman world. 
As Matilda Arvidsson writes in our first article, ‘Targeting, Gender, and the International 
Posthumanitarian Law and Practice: Framing the Question of the Human in International 
Humanitarian Law’, the producers and consumers of today’s armed conflicts are ‘always-
already digital and material more-than-human: neither fully ‘machine’ nor fully ‘human’ and 
by necessity never autonomous nor free.’ Arvidsson narrows in on one moment of the 
production of armed conflict – the killing of a live target. Reading transcripts from a drone 
attack in Uruzgan, Afghanistan in 2010 that resulted in a civilian massacre, she shows how 
contemporary practices of targeting rely on the ‘digital identification’ of a person, together 
with visual cues, to kill or to let live. Crucially, this is a deeply gendered mode and moment 
of production. Christiane Wilke’s article, ‘How International Law Learned to Love the 
Bomb: Civilians and the Regulation of Aerial Warfare in the 1920s’, illustrates how historical 
efforts to regulate emerging methods and weapons of armed conflict are bound up with 
presumptions about which populations are worth protecting, a thoroughly racialised 
biopolitics bound up with a colonial framework. Kristin Sandvik’s article, ‘Technology, Dead 
Male Bodies and Feminist Recognition: Gendering ICT Harm Theory’ considers how 
information communication technologies (ICTs), data collection and big data are used in both 
drone warfare as well as in the regulation of the human refugee consequences of conflict. She 
shows how the ways in which data collection and mediation are formed and used render male 
refugees and their lived experiences statistically invisible at the international level. 
Considering both the context of conflict as well as their impact on human lives, Sandvik’s 
paper highlights the ways in which certain men are deemed more targetable or less worthy of 
saving by nature of their perceived hegemonic masculinity.  
In her article ‘War’s Perpetuity: Disabled Bodies of War and the Exoskeleton of Equality’, 
Gina Heathcote examines developments in exoskeleton technologies. She shows how they 
unsettle the assumed maleness of the combatant on the battlefield and notes the effect of their 
participation in armed conflict on narratives of gender, masculinity and debility more 
generally. Noting how exoskeletons are being posed by some commenters as the answer to 
gender equality on the battlefield, with these machines working to ensure that female soldiers 
can be “as strong as the men”, Heathcote’s article challenges the use of gender equality 
underlying such debates, highlighting how these technologies work very much within 
gendered and ableist norms, both being limited by and perpetuating them. Emily Jones’s 
article ‘A Posthuman-Xenofeminist Analysis of the Discourse on Autonomous Weapons 
Systems and Other Killing Machines’ also considers who or what is participating in armed 
conflict, taking into account existing weapons systems such as the Samsung SGR-A1, 
artificial intelligence, drones and technology-assisted learning. She highlights the ways in 
which the machine and the human already interact and work together in multiple ways, 
questioning the discourses around autonomous weapons that seek to exceptionalise such 
systems. She argues that while current attempts at legal regulation distinguish between civil 
and military technologies, such a distinction becomes impossible if we consider the financial, 
political and labour structures that make each category of technology contingent upon the 
other. Helene Kazan’s article, ‘The Architecture of Slow, Structural and Spectacular Violence 
and the Poetic Testimony of War’ straddles, on the one hand, a description of war’s impact 
on human lives, and on the other, the human lived experience of war. Drawing on her own 
experience of living through conflict, she centres her discussion on the affective experience 
of both human and architectural structures in the context of Lebanon’s civil war. Kazan, in 
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the mode of écriture feminine, describes how Lebanon and its inhabitants are material sensors 
of the ‘slow, structural and spectacular’ violence. Focusing on the question of where and when 
armed conflict takes/has taken place, she demonstrates how this is bound up with the question 
of who is affected by that conflict, and how that effect is expressed.  
 
What role does law play? 
Finally, the invested role of law appears throughout this terrain. As a field that deals in 
classification and categorisation, it holds out the promise of permitting and prohibiting 
certain behaviours, drawing the line between the licit and the illicit across battlefields and 
populations. It promises to do this through international treaties banning certain methods and 
weapons of warfare, for example, and by crystallising the norms of acceptable conduct. Yet 
there are challenges to this ambition on multiple fronts: the field of international law not only 
notoriously suffers from problems with compliance, but also from the more fundamental 
issue that it enables violence whilst seeking to constrain it.16 Critical scholars of international 
law experiencing a nostalgic desire for faith in legal forms might think of the opposition to 
the 2003 Iraq invasion that was based upon its illegality, when ‘all it would have taken to 
make the war legal was Security Council authorization’.17  
Our research agenda concerning gender, war and technology regards law’s role from a 
standpoint of critical distance: as a vehicle for projecting strong state power and facilitating 
‘proportionate’ violence grounded in ‘military necessity’, as well as a possible means of 
constraining warfare and providing redress. For example, Kazan suggests that war torts be 
created in international law to provide some accountability in the case of the use of 
autonomous weapons systems, at the same time arguing for a radical change to the way in 
which law thinks about evidence.18 Arvidsson suggests that the binary-gendered notion of the 
‘human’ in IHL (combatant/man, civilian/woman), as well as the privileging of the ‘human’ 
and human agency in IHL more generally, requires us to rethink the boundaries of 
accountability where violence is enacted in the course of armed conflict. Wilke illustrates 
how past legal formations that emerged in the colonial period continue to structure 
permissible violence in the present framework of international humanitarian law. In the 
praxis section, Clare Brown offers a practitioner’s account of the use of ICTs in conflict and 
peacebuilding situations, including messaging and data collection technologies, in her article 
‘The Use of ICTs in Conflict and Peacebuilding: A Feminist Analysis’. Brown argues that in 
spite of the proliferation of new technological forms that are designed to respond to and 
document armed conflict, many of these ICTs have failed to incorporate the lived experiences 
of women, let alone feminist perspectives. Even if they were to incorporate feminist 
perspectives, however, tensions remain between the desire to use technology for change, as in 
feminist posthumanism and xenofeminism, and the recognition of its embeddedness within 
both militarism and capitalism.  
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An invitation  
Each of the articles in this special issue engages with and contributes to feminist theory. 
Critical theories on posthumanism have emerged largely outside of legal scholarship, from 
disciplines such as philosophy, gender studies, critical theory, cultural studies, art theory and 
media studies, at times informed by feminist approaches.19 The impact of posthumanism in 
legal scholarship has been relatively limited to date, exemplified by the very humanist way in 
which legal and political discourse is usually still framed.20  
Arvidsson asks us to think about the ‘humans’ of international humanitarian law, arguing that 
they are first and foremost imagined as gendered entities. She shows that this is complicated 
by the scope and forms of certain technologies used in armed conflict, noting nonetheless 
how this frees us to question the presumed subjects of international law. Wilke adopts a 
historical approach, situating aerial warfare in a broader colonial history and arguing that 
civilian status was racially and spatially circumscribed. Heathcote draws out a tension in the 
application of posthuman theory to law. Showing the problematic ways in which science and 
technology strands of posthumanism are promoting exoskeletons as a solution for gender 
inequality, she argues for a critical, intersectional feminist posthuman discourse on 
exoskeleton technology to ensure that technological advancement and the posthuman subject 
are not merely used to recreate the same humanist, masculine order. Highlighting how 
feminist theory and feminist posthumanism in particular has generally taken an anti-
militarism stance, Jones notes that the xenofeminist manifesto is silent on the topic of 
militarism, and argues for reclaiming anti-militarism for the xenofeminist project, illustrating 
how that approach can be useful for critiquing the uses of autonomous weapons systems. 
Sandvik brings a masculinity studies perspective to the use of data collection, drone 
technologies and big data, noting a lack of focus on the way in which such use impacts on 
men. Kazan draws on art theory and French feminism to create a way of talking about the 
lived experience of conflict which can be used to rethink traditional ideas of what constitutes 
lawful evidence. Brown adds a perspective from legal practice, arguing for greater inclusion 
of women and feminist approaches in understanding and applying these new technologies. 
Animated by concerns about the relative shortage of scholarly feminist perspectives on 
technology and conflict, this special issue emerged out of an international workshop 
organised by Emily Jones in June 2016 at SOAS University of London that sought to address 
this gap. We hope this collection of texts will invite others to join our continuing discussions 
on gender, war and technology. There are many other perspectives we would like to engage 
on these intersecting topics, including critical animal studies, critical environmental studies, 
war and peace studies, critical political geography, and area studies, among others. We would 
like to thank the other SOAS workshop participants, whose collaborative discussions raised 
some of the questions addressed this special issue: Sabiha Allouche, Louise Arimatsu, Ursula 
Del Aguila, Biye Gao, Kate Grady, Gina Heathcote, Fleur Johns, Sheri Labenski, Bérénice 
Schramm and Chieu Wan Liu. Thanks are also due to all of the peer reviewers who dedicated 
considerable time and thought to providing excellent and detailed feedback, and to the Board 
of Editors at the Australian Feminist Law Journal for their guidance and support throughout. 
                                                          
19
 Braidotti describes ‘three major strands in contemporary posthuman thought: the first comes from moral 
philosophy and develops a reactive form of the posthuman; the second, from science and technology studies, 
enforces an analytic form of the posthuman; and the third, from my own tradition of anti-humanist philosophies 
of subjectivity, proposes a critical post-humanism.’ Braidotti, as above n 9 at 38. 
20
 This has been noted by Upendra Baxi. See; Upendra Baxi, Human Rights in a Posthuman World (Oxford 
University Press 2009). Posthumanist theory has, on the other hand, been taken up in the past decade by scholars 
working in law and critical animal studies: see for example Ed Mussawir and Yoriko Otomo, Law and the 
Question of the Animal: A Critical Jurisprudence (Routledge 2013). 
  
 7 
 
